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"MIXED METAPHORS," REVISIONIST
HISTORY AND POST-HYPNOTIC
SUGGESTIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION
OF SPORTS ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS: THE
SECOND CIRCUIT'S USE IN CLARETT OF A
PIAZZA- LIKE "INNOVATIVE
REINTERPRETATION OF SUPREME COURT
DOGMA"
BY WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has a history of misinterpreting cases
that involve sports antitrust exemptions. The most infamous antitrust
exemption case of this sort is Flood v. Kuhn.I This case "was an antitrust
action based on baseball's failure to allow St. Louis Cardinals' outfielder Curt
Flood to negotiate his own contract with another team on the basis that 'free
agency' in any form, was not permitted under the reserve system." 2 As Curt
Flood said, "I should be able to negotiate for myself in an open market and see
just how much money this little body is worth. I shouldn't be confronted with
an either-or proposition like the one now facing me. Somebody needs to go up
against the system. I'm ready." 3 Flood affirmed the earlier cases of Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs4 and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,5 on a strict stare decisis basis,
and continued baseball's anomalous antitrust exemption. 6 The rationale was
* Walter T. Champion, Jr. is Professor of Law at Texas Southern University Thurgood Marshall
School of Law in Houston, Texas. He is also the author of many sports law treatises and has
published numerous law review articles concerning a variety of sports issues.
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, (1972).
2. Walter T. Champion, Jr., The Baseball Antitrust Exemption Revisited: 21 Years After Flood v.
Kuhn, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 573, 577 (1994) [hereinafter Champion, Baseball].
3. CURT FLOOD WITH RICHARD CARTER, THE WAY IT Is 190-91 (1971).
4. See generally Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
5. See generally Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
6. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84; see also Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 577-78.
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that the exemption was an established aberration that must be continued, and if
change was to occur, then legislative action was the appropriate vehicle. 7
Judge Friendly declined to overrule Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore8 in
Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, but freely
acknowledged that it "was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days, [and]
that the rationale of Toolson [was] extremely dubious .... ,9 The Supreme
Court, in Radovich v. National Football League,10 noted that the distinction
between baseball and other sports'1 that have not earned an exemption was
"unrealistic," "inconsistent," and "illogical.' 12  Because Flood was an
apparently irrational decision, 13 other lower courts were forced to develop an
"innovative reinterpretation" of its dogma.14  In Piazza v. Major League
Baseball, which involved the purchase and sale of a baseball franchise, 15
Judge Padova of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed Flood through
a revisionist reinterpretation 16 so that its exemption would appear to cover
only the now moribund reserve clause. 17 Through skillful opinion crafting,
"Judge Padova reinterpreted some 70 years of Supreme Court
precedence"1 8-"Federal Baseball held [that] the business of baseball [was]
outside the scope of the Act," 19 but Toolson and Flood essentially limited
Federal Baseball's exemption to include only the reserve clause. 20
The second most important sports exemption case is Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.,2 1  which concerned the so-called nonstatutory labor
exemption.22 To digress, the Sherman Antitrust Act 23 makes every
7. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-85; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 577.
8. Id. "If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long
standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court." Id at 284.
9. Salerno v. American League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
10. Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
11. Id. at 450.
12. Id. at 452.
13. See e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "This Court's
decision in Federal Baseball ... is a derelict in the stream of law that we, its creator, should remove.
Only a romantic view of a rather dismal business account over the last 50 years would keep that
derelict in midstream." Id
14. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420,436-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
15. Id. at 422-23.
16. Id. at 438.
17. Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 583.
18. Id. at 583;
19. Radovich, v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445,452 (1957).
20. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436-38; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 583.
21. See generally Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
22. Id. at 243-50.
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combination in the form of a conspiracy that involves interstate commerce
illegal. 24 This exemption emanates from the statutory labor exemption,
25
which protects certain union activities from antitrust scrutiny. 26  The
nonstatutory exemption was developed by the Supreme Court in nonsports
cases. 27 Under this exemption, any union-management agreement that is a
product of good faith negotiation will be protected from the scope of antitrust
laws. 28
"[I]n Brown... the Court [held] that the exemption is limited to
mandatory subjects... and covers only conduct that arises from the collective
bargaining process."29 "[However,] the Court in Brown... left the precise
contours of the exemption undefined." 30
Maurice Clarett was the star tailback in Ohio State University's
undefeated 2002 football season. 31 Because of reports of criminal behavior,
Ohio State and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
suspended him from the 2003-04 season, with the distinct possibility that the
NCAA would not permit him to play in the 2004-05 season. 32 He sought to
be included in the pool of players eligible for the 2004 National Football
League (NFL) draft to be held on April 24-25, 2004. 33 However, he was
unable to enter the draft class because of an NFL rule that allowed only those
athletes who were three years out of high school to be eligible for the draft.
34
Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York granted plaintiffs
23. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
24. Id. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 58 (2005) [hereinafter
CHAMPION, NUTSHELL].
25. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 530 (2004) [hereinafter
CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS]. The statutory labor exemption originated from the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1998). Id.
26. Id. at 350.
27. See generally Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
28. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25, at 530; see also Walter T. Champion, Clarett v.
NFL and the Reincarnation of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 47 S. TEX.
L. REV. 587, 592 (2006) [hereinafter Champion, Clarett].
29. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996)).
30. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 11), 369 F. 3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) rev'g Clarett
v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1l) 306 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
31. Clarettl, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 387; Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 594.
32. Clarettl, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
33. Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 130; Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388-89.
34. Clarett I, 369 F.3d at 126; Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385-87. Champion, Clarett, supra
note 28, at 594.
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motion for summary judgment on February 5, 2004.35 Judge Scheindlin also
denied the NFL's motion to stay pending appeal on February 11, 2004.36
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Judge
Scheindlin's summary judgment decision on May 24, 2004.37 The Second
Circuit found that this rule represented a condition for initial employment
because it affected the job security of veteran players, and therefore had
tangible effects on mandatory collective bargaining subjects, for example,
wages, hours, and conditions of employment, of current NFL Players. 38
The Second Circuit in Clarett v. National Football League (Clarett III),
was forced to deal with the Supreme Court's precedent in Brown. 39 However,
Justice Breyer-writing for the majority in Brown-indicated that "[o]ur
holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint imposition
of terms by employers ... "40 It was imperative that the Second Circuit in
Clarett III connect the rationale of Brown to the particulars of Clarett v.
National Football League (Clarett). "[T]he Supreme Court in Brown...
h[e]ld that the ... exemption protected the NFL's unilateral implementation of
new salary caps for developmental squad players after its ... agreement with
the.., union had expired and negotiations ... over [the] proposal reached an
impasse." 41
The Second Circuit's main connective argument asserts in the negative
that Clarett III did "not argue... that the Supreme Court's treatment of the
non-statutory exemption... [gave] reason to doubt the authority of our prior
decisions .... Because... our prior decisions in this area fully
comport[ed]-in approach and result-with the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown, we regard them as controlling authority. ' 42 In sum, the Second
Circuit in Brown "is guilty of mixing metaphors in its attempt to connect
Brown"43 to its own basketball nonstatutory exemptions cases, National
35. Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410-411. "Clarett's motion for summary judgment is granted..
Because the Rule violates the antitrust laws, it cannot preclude Clarett's eligibility for the 2004
NFL draft." Id.
36. Clarett 11, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 414. "If a stay is granted, Clarett will miss the 2004 draft. He
will not be eligible to play in the NFL until the 2005 draft ..... If the stay is granted, Clarett will
have effectively lost his lawsuit." Id (emphasis in original).
37. Clarett 111, 369 F. 3d at 143.
38. Id. at 139-140.
39. Id. at 135.
40. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
41. Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 135 (internal citations omitted).
42. Id. at 138.
43. Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 612.
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Basketball Association v. Williams (Williams),44 Wood v. National Basketball
Association,45 and Caldwell v. American Basketball Association.46 Maurice
Clarett was a football player "and the whole universe or collective bargaining
in football is different than ... basketball. Brown does not broadly embrace
the exemption; there is nothing in Brown which ... segue[s] their tacit and
limited approval of the exemption to include [the] rule... in Clarett, that was
never directly bargained over."47
My theory is that the Supreme Court has trouble with sports antitrust
exemption cases. But Piazza initiated a respectful "innovative
reinterpretation" of anomalous Supreme Court cases by using judicial
legerdemain, including mixed metaphors, revisionist history, and post-
hypnotic suggestions-whatever it takes. This judicial surgery was emulated
by the Second Circuit in Clarett III with less glorious results. Clarett III
reinterpretated Brown, which was less idiosyncratic than Flood. In Piazza, the
court worked with the relevant jurisprudence; however, the Second Circuit in
Clarett III incorrectly reinterpreted Brown by inventing precedent.
I. SPORTS ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS, GENERALLY
Baseball's exemption is an anomalous "derelict in the stream of
law .... -"48 "If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the
Congress and not by this Court." 49 The exemption was reaffirmed again by
the Supreme Court in Flood, and exempts baseball from the antitrust laws. 50
There is no chance that it will be extended to others sports. Radovich, for
example, is controlling in football and specifically denies immunity despite the
obvious similarities between the sports. 51  Baseball is just "a narrow
application of... stare decisis.' '52 However, the Curt Flood Act of 199813
established a partial repeal of baseball's common law exemption from the
44. See generally Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. See generally Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
46. See generally Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995); Champion,
Clarett, supra note 28, at 612.
47. Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 612-13 (emphasis added).
48. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
49. Id. at 284.
50. See CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25, at 529.
51. Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445,452 (1957).
52. U.S. v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955).
53. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (2000).
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antitrust laws.54 The partial repeal specifically does not apply to minor leagues
and minor league reserve clauses, the amateur draft, the "Professional Baseball
Agreement," franchise relocation, club ownership rules, ownership transfers,
the relationship between commissioners and owners, baseball marketing, the
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961,55 the league's relationship with umpires,
and "persons [not] in the business of organized professional major league
baseball. ... -56 "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
application to organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor
exemption from the antitrust laws." 57
Two other exemptions are particular to professional football. One
authorizes agreements between the NFL and television networks to pool and
sell a unitary video package. 58 The second exemption allows blackouts of
outside game telecasts into home territories when the home team is playing,
and permits the blackout of home games in the home territory. 59 The
"statutory" labor exemption is derived from the Clayton Act 60 and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. 61 The purpose of this exemption is to allow unions to
eliminate competition from the other unions; but this privilege cannot be
claimed by businesses. 62 The nonstatutory labor exemption emanates from
the statutory labor exemption and protects certain union activities from
antitrust scrutiny. 63
The "nonstatutory labor exemption is at the heart of nearly every antitrust
suit in professional sports." 64 This exemption was developed by the United
States Supreme Court in nonsports cases. 65 Under this exemption, any union-
management agreement that is a product of good faith negotiation will be
protected from the scope of antitrust laws. 66 This exemption is applicable
where alleged player restraint mechanisms primarily affect only those parties
54. See generally CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25, at 539-41.
55. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (2000).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 27(d)(4).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1291; see also U.S. v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); see also U.S. v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
61. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1998); Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at
591.
62. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391 (2004).
63. See id.; see also CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25, at 530.
64. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25, at 530.
65. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622-23 (1975); Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co. 381 U.S. 676, 689-91 (1965).
66. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS supra note 25, at 530.
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to the collective bargaining agreement, where the restraint concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and where the provision that is
sought to be exempted is a product of bona fide, arms-length bargaining. 67
The preeminent sports nonstatutory exemption case is Mackey v. National
Football League.68 The plaintiff sued to determine whether the NFL's
"Rozelle Rule" violated antitrust laws. 69  This rule allowed the NFL
Commissioner, one Alvin "Pete" Rozelle, to require the club acquiring a free
agent to compensate the former team with money, players, draft picks, or all
three. 70 Although this rule did not deal with a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, it operated to restrict a player's mobility to move freely from team
to team; therefore, depressing salaries. 71 The court also held that there was no
bona fide arm's length bargaining over the rule on the basis that the rule
remained unchanged because it was unilaterally promulgated by
management.72
However, other courts found that the nonstatutory exemption could apply
to players restriction mechanisms in professional sports. In McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., the court found the exemption applicable to protect the
National Hockey League's version of a reserve system.73 The court found that
there was sufficient bona fide bargaining to trigger the exemption even though
management did not yield from its initial position. 74 Powell v. National
Football League continued the exemption even after the parties reached
impasse. 75  In Wood, the exemption protected the salary cap.76  Because
"Wood challenged agreements concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining,
to which labor law attaches a host of rights and obligations, [the court] saw no
place for the application of the antitrust laws and found the non-statutory
exemption applicable." 77 In Brown, the Supreme Court held that the NFL's
67. Id.
68. See generally Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); see also
Walter T. Champion, Jr., Looking Back to Mackey v. NFL to Revive the Non-Statutory Labor
Exemption in Professional Sports, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85, 94 (2008) [hereinafter
Champion, Mackey].
69. Mackey, 543 F. 2d at 609-10; Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 592.
70. Mackey, 543 F. 2d at 610-11.
71. Id. at 615; see also Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 592.
72. Id. at 616.
73. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979); Champion, Clarett,
supra note 34 at 593.
74. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1193.
75. Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1302-04 (8th Cir. 1989).
76. Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1987).
77. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 111), 369 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2004).
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unilateral imposition of a fixed salary for developmental squad players was
protected by the nonstatutory exemption. 78
III. THE SUPREME COURT MISSES THE MARK IN FEDERAL BASEBALL CLUB
OF BALTIMORE, ToOLSON, FLOOD, AND BROWN
Baseball's exemption was created in 1922 by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in a unanimous Supreme Court decision in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore.79 In Holmes's defense, it could be argued that the clubs were
organized for profit but that the league was not.80 Although Holmes did see it
as a business, he thought that the travel was mere incident, and not the
essential thing; therefore, the interstate commerce requirements were not
met.81 It was "freely acknowledge[d] ... that Federal Baseball was not one
of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days. ..."82 "Baseball was a mess, and the
key to its nightmarish existence was the infamous reserve clause." 83  This
clause was not a "clause" per se, but a "system" of interrelated player contract
provisions and league rules. 84 It can be defined as a stipulation in an athlete's
contract that attempts to bind the player perpetually to the client. It provides
that if the player does not sign his contract for the succeeding season, all of the
provisions of the old contract are automatically renewed, except for the
amount of compensation.85 Thus, the reserve clause is also renewed and the
player is bound to his club for life, unless his contract is traded, sold, assigned,
or terminated. 86 Under the reserve system, a ball player was the property of
his team for life. A dissatisfied player's only alternatives would be to request
his contract be traded, to retire, or to die; on the other side, management could
release a player or assign his contract to any team without the player's
consent. 87
Judge Frank, in Gardella v. Chandler, opined that even though the
"[d]efendants suggest that 'organized baseball,' which supplies millions of
78. Brown v. Nat'l Football League, 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
79. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1922);
Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 574..
80. Nat'l Leagues of Prof'I Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club, 269 F. 681, 683-85 (D.C. Cir.
1920).
81. Id. at 209.
82. Salerno v. Am. League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
83. Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 575.
84. Flood v. Kuhn, 409 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1978).
85. Id; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 575.
86. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25, at 511.
87. See generally Walter Champion, Baseball's Third Strike: Labor Law and the National
Pastime (pt.2), 4 PENN. L. J-REP. (1991).
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Americans with desirable diversion, will be unable to exist without the
'reserve clause."' 88 Regardless, "the answer is that the public's pleasure does
not authorize the courts to condone illegality, and that no court should strive
ingeniously to legalize a private (even if benevolent) dictatorship." 89 To
Judge Frank, the reserve clause was "shockingly repugnant to moral
principles,... condemning 'involuntarily servitude'... [f]or the 'reserve
clause' . .. results in something resembling peonage of the baseball player." 90
The Second Circuit in Gardella in 1949 almost ended the reserve clause, but
the parties settled the case before the Supreme Court could review the question
of baseball's exemption. 91 Danny Gardella of the New York Giants left New
York for the Mexican League but later changed his mind. 92 Upon his return,
he was blacklisted by Commissioner "Happy" Chandler.93 Although the
Gardella court saw baseball as engaged in interstate commerce and subject to
the antitrust laws, it felt that the Supreme Court would eventually decline to
uphold stare decisis and Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore-it was wrong. 94
However, in 1953 the Supreme Court, in the case of Toolson, ignored
Gardella and merely affirmed Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore in a per
curium opinion.95 This etched the Federal Baseball anomaly in stone. 96
Toolson cited Federal Baseball Club of Balitmore as holding "that the
business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of
professional baseball players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws." 97 The Toolson Court based its holding on the fact that [t]he business
has ... been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was
not subject to existing antitrust legislation .... We think that if there are evils
in this field which now warrant application.., of the antitrust laws it should
be by legislation. 98
88. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 415 (2d Cir. 1949).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 409.
91. John T. Wolohan, Symposium, The Curt Flood Act: The Curt Flood Act of 1998 and Major
League Baseball's FederalAntitrust Exemption, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 347, 356 (1999).
92. See Gardella, 172 F.2d at 403.
93. See id. at 403, 410.
94. Id. at 409; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 576.
95. See generally Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The dissent of Justices
Burton and Reed was much more interesting in that they realized that baseball was now a very big
industry that included large revenues from radio and television and that baseball was certainly deeply
involved in interstate commerce. Id. at 358 (Burton, J., dissenting).
96. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 273 (1972); Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 576.
97. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
98. Id.
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The Toolson Court based its decision "on the authority of Federal
Baseball... so far as that decision determine[d] that Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws." 99 However, in his dissent, Justice Burton, with Justice Reed
concurring, realized that "the present popularity of organized baseball
increases, ... the importance of its compliance with standards of
reasonableness comparable with those now required by law of interstate trade
or commerce."100  Justice Reed would remand "for a consideration of the
merits of the alleged violations of the Sherman Act." 101
The contract of Curt Flood, star of the St. Louis Cardinals, and its
subsequent assignment to the Philadelphia Phillies, was the basis for the Flood
decision. Flood stated, "I can go to Philadelphia or I can quit baseball
altogether. I will not go to Philadelphia." 10 2 Flood reasoned that "[lt]he issue
was not me alone but the reserve system. Like thousands of players before
me, I had been caught in its machinery. Before being ground to bits, I'd get
out. 1 03 Flood "want[ed] to give the courts a chance to outlaw the reserve
system. [He] want[ed] to go out like a man instead of disappearing like a
bottle cap." 104
Flood affirmed Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and Toolson on a
strict stare decisis basis. 10 5 The Court reasoned that "[i]f there is any
inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long
standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this court. 10 6 The
majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun who "thought that if the
antitrust laws were applied to baseball, its unique position as the national
pastime would be undermined." 10 7 While ostensibly researching the abortion
case, Roe v. Wade, he was actually "playing with baseball cards" 108 in his
search for statistics to compile the requisite minimum numbers and
qualifications so as to appear on his list of "celebrated names" of the game. 109
Justice Marshall protested that the list did not contain any African-
99. Id. (internal citations omitted).
100. Id at 364-65 (Burton, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 365.
102. FLOOD WITH CARTER, supra note 3, at 188.
103. Id. at 190.
104. Id.
105. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1978).
106. Id. at 284.
107. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETffEN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 190
(1979).
108. Id. at 190.
109. Flood, 407 U.S. at 262-63.
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Americans.110 Justice Blackmun defended his selections by pointing out that
most of the list predated World War II and that African-American ball players
were excluded from the major leagues until 1947, which was precisely Justice
Marshall's point."' Justice Blackmun, who still hoped to secure Justice
Marshall's vote, capitulated and added Jackie Robinson, Roy Campanella, and
Satchel Paige. 112 However, Justice Marshall remained faithful to Curt Flood
and wrote his own dissent. "13
In Justice Douglas's dissent, he indicated that Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore was "a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, should
remove." 114 Justice Marshall, in his dissent, reminded his brethren that "[t]he
importance of the antitrust laws to every citizen must not be minimized. They
are as important to baseball players as they are to football players, lawyers,
doctors, or members of any other class of workers." 115 The end of the reserve
clause appeared to be imminent and was hastened by the newly reinvigorated
Major League Baseball Players Association, which under collective bargaining
eventually produced an agreement that allowed for neutral arbitration of
grievances. 116  In the decision of In re Arbitration of Messersmith,117
arbitrator Peter Seitz released pitchers Andy Messersmith and David McNally
from their reserve clauses, thus making them free agents and allowing them to
bargain for the highest bidder. This arbitration decision was affirmed in
Kansas City Royals Baseball Club v. Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n. 118
Management and labor eventually arrived at a formula that gave players the
opportunity to become free agents in a "reentry draft," which began in
1976.119 In Flood, the court added that "[t]he conclusion we have reached
makes it unnecessary for us to consider the respondents' additional argument
that the reserve system is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and that
federal labor policy therefore exempts the reserve system from the operation
110. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 107, at 191.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. It was queried of Blackmun, after the opinion was published, as to why he omitted Mel
Ott, the great right fielder for the New York Yankees. Blackmun insisted that he had included Ott.
Id. at 192. The clerk said that the name was not in the printed opinion. Id. Blackmun said he would
never forgive himself. Id.
114. Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 292.
116. See generally Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 579.
117. In re Arbitration of Messersmith, 66 L.A. 101, 118 (1975).
118. See generally Kansas City Royals Baseball Club v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.) aff'd, 532 F. 2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
119. See generally Walter Champion, Take It Out on the Ballgame: Why the Phillies are for the
Safe, 4 PENN. L.J.-REP. 2 (1981); see also Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 579.
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of federal antitrust laws." 120 Justice Marshall, in dissent continues that:
Lurking in the background is a hurdle of recent vintage .... In 1966,
the... Players Association was formed. It is the collective-bargaining
representative for all major league baseball players. Respondents argue that
the reserve system is now part and parcel of the ... agreement and that
because it is a mandatory subject. . . , the federal labor statutes are applicable,
not federal antitrust laws. [But, t]he lower courts [in Flood] did not rule on this
argument, having decided the case solely on the basis of [baseball's] antitrust
exemption. 121
Although the Court in Brown held that the nonstatutory exemption
applied, it left the precise contours of the exemption undefined. 122 "[I]n
Brown .... the Court reiterated that the exemption is limited to mandatory
subjects.., and covers only conduct that arises from the bargaining
process."'123 Mackey envisioned some situations where "non-labor parties
may potentially avail themselves of the nonstatutory labor exemption where
they are parties to ... agreements pertaining to mandatory subjects ... ."124
"[T]he Supreme Court in Brown... h[e]ld that the non-statutory exemption
protected the NFL's unilateral implementation of new salary caps for
developmental squad players after its.., agreement with the.., union had
expired and negotiations ... over that proposal reached an impasse."' 125
Brown, held that the exemption protects what would otherwise be an illegal
restraint of trade under section one of the Sherman Act. 126
The Supreme Court noted in Brown that although they affirmed the
decision of the appeals court, "we do not interpret the exemption as
broadly.... " 127 The Brown Court declined to apply the exemption simply
because of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. 128 By
implication, the Brown Court intimated its approval of a similar approach
utilized in Mackey. 129 The Court intimated that the exemption should only be
120. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285 (footnote omitted).
121. Id.
122. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 111), 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2004) (citing Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996)).
123. Clarett v. Nat'l Football Leauge (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (2004) (citing Brown,
518 U.S. at 239).
124. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
125. Clarettll 1, 369 F.3d at 135 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. 231).
126. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id; Champion, Mackey, supra note 68, at 96.
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applied properly where certain other criteria were also met. 130 These other
conditions were similar to the Mackey test, which stipulated that, in addition to
the existence of a collective bargaining relationship, the provision must only
affect the parties to the agreement, concern a mandatory subject, and the
parties must have bargained in good faith.1 3 1 The key to both opinions is that
the questioned rule must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
The Second Circuit in Clarett III went to great lengths to synthesize its
"decisions in this area[-Caldwell, Williams, and Woods-], [to the alleged]
"similar reasoning.. . in Brown. "132 But, Justice Breyer who wrote for the
majority in Brown, indicated that "[o]ur holding is not intended to insulate
from antitrust review every joint imposition of terms by employers." 133
Justice Breyer continually referred to mandatory subjects within the
collective bargaining agreement. 134 His reasons for finding the exemption in
Brown were specific, precise, and particular:
That conduct took place during and immediately after a collective-
bargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful
operation of the bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties were
required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship.
Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint
imposition of terms by employers, for an agreement among employers could
be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not
significantly interfere with that process. We need not decide in this case
whether or where, within these extreme outer boundaries to draw that line.
Nor would it be appropriate for us to do so without the detailed views of the
Board .... 135
In his dissent in Brown, Justice Stevens noted that the "limited judicial
exemption complements its statutory counterpart by ensuring that unions
which engage in collective bargaining to enhance employees' wages may
enjoy the benefits of the resulting agreements. 136 Justice Stevens also warned
130. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-37.
131. Id.; see also Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976);
Champion, Mackey, supra note 68, at 95-96.
132. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 11), 369 F.3d 124, 135 (2004); Champion, Clarett,
supra note 28, at 611.
133. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
134. Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 609.
135. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250, at 250 (internal citations omitted).
136. Id. at 254.
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that "exemptions should be construed narrowly, and judicially crafted
exemptions more narrowly still. .... "137 However, even the Second Circuit in
Clarett III was forced to admit that "the Court in Brown... left the precise
contours of the exemption undefined."1 38
"Brown does not broadly embrace the exemption; there is nothing in
Brown which would segue their tacit and limited approval of the exemption to
include [a] rule, such as the one in Clarett, that was never directly bargained
over." 139 Judge Scheindlin reiterated that Brown's analysis, by emphasizing
that the exemption, established a "labor policy favoring... collective
bargaining, which require good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, and
working conditions."140 Judge Scheindlin also noted that Brown "recognized
the primacy of collective bargaining in the workplace .... ."141 Judge
Scheindlin's interpretation of Brown is summarized as follows: the exemption
should be limited to those mandatory subjects that were fairly negotiated. 142
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IN PIAZZA "REINTERPRETS" FLOOD
Piazza, is a 1993 Eastern District of Pennsylvania case that involved
two leading investors in one of the groups that sought to purchase the San
Francisco Giants and relocate the team to Tampa. 143 These investors alleged
that the National League rules that required approval by the other club owner
before the team could be either moved or purchased, was an illegal conspiracy
in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws. 144
Although Piazza does not involve the reserve clause, it does involve
structure; 145 however, the purchasing and selling of a business enterprise is
certainly not unique to baseball even in those cases where some form of group
approval is necessary to buy into a franchise. The job of Federal District
Judge Padova, in Piazza, was to review Flood through a revisionist
microscope and re-interpret it so that the exemption would appear to cover
137. Id. at 258.
138. Clarett 111, 369 F.3d at 138; see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
139. Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 613; see also, Brown, 518 U.S. at 248-50.
140. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F.Supp. 379, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting
Brown, 518 U.S. at 236) (emphasis in original).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 393; see also, Brown, 518 U.S. at 239.
143. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420, 422 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
144. Id. at 421-22; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 581.
145. Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 435.
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only the reserve clause." 146 At best, this was a very difficult bit of judicial
word twisting, but here the sanctity of a Holmes unanimous decision needed to
be maintained. 147
Judge Padova's journey was a reinterpretation that revisited Flood and
saw it as viewing Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and Toolson as limited
to the reserve system. 148 Piazza also went so far as to counting the number of
times that Flood mentioned the reserve clause: "Flood refers to the reserve
clause at least four times." 149 The Piazza court continued, "[i]n Flood, the
Supreme Court exercised its discretion to invalidate the rule of Federal
Baseball and Toolson. Thus no rule from those cases binds the lower courts as
a matter of stare decisis."150  From there, Judge Padova concluded that
baseball's antitrust exemption, which was created in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, was limited to baseball's reserve system; and because both the
parties in Piazza agreed that the reserve system was not an issue, Judge
Padova rejected Major League Baseball's argument that its decision to deny
the plaintiff the opportunity to purchase and relocate an existing baseball
franchise was exempt from antitrust liability. 151
Piazza, of course, could not overrule Flood. Judge Padova then was
forced to reread Flood so that it could be restricted to pertaining to the reserve
clause only. 152 Flood admitted that the exemption was illogical, but an
"inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by Congress
and not by this Court."' 153 By carefully crafting his opinion, Judge Padova
"reinterpreted some 70 years of Supreme Court precedence."' 54 Although
Federal Baseball held that the business of baseball was outside the scope of
the Sherman Act, 155 Toolson and Flood essentially limited Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore's exemption to include only the reserve clause. 156 Because
the exemption was merely a blind application of stare decisis anyway, Piazza
implied that Toolson and Flood taken together, created their own branch of
146. See generally id. at 435-40; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 581.
147. Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 438-41.
148. Id. at 420.
149. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original).
150. Id. at 438.
151. Id. at441.
152. Id. at 436.
153. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972).
154. See Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 433; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 583.
155. Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
156. Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 438.
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precedent, different from Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,157 which
restricts the exemption to the reserve clause only. 158
All of the Flood authors wanted to terminate the exemption. Most
hoped that it would be by congressional fiat. 159 Although Piazza is only an
interlocutory decision, it is an honorable alternative. Piazza is a thoughtfully
written attempt to solve the Flood conundrum. It reinterprets Flood; however,
it has limited influence because it is only a federal district court case. In short,
Piazza carefully, patiently, and intelligently explained why the proposed sale
and relocation of a baseball team was not protected by baseball's antitrust
exemption. 160
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT IN CLARETTIII ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT BROWN
Although the Supreme Court has successfully defined the scope and
purpose of the nonstatutory antitrust exemption in professional sports, it has
been less clear defining its terms and application. 161 However, Justice Breyer,
for the majority in Brown, set sufficient guidelines when he admonished that
"[o]ur holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint
imposition of terms by employers . "...-162 It is impossible to "require groups
of employers and employees to bargain together, but [also] forbid them to
make among themselves... competition-restricting agreements potentially
necessary [that] make the process work .... Thus, the.., exemption
recognizes that, to [have] federal labor laws.., and meaningful collective
bargaining... , some restraints on competition.., must be shielded from
antitrust sanctions." 163 In Brown, Justice Breyer indicated that
petitioners and their supporters [, the union,] concede.., the legal
existence of the exemption... [and] its application ... to make the statutorily
authorized collective-bargaining process work... [and if so] the exemption
must apply both to employers and to employees.... Consequently, the
question before us is one of determining the exemption's scope: Does it apply
to an agreement among several employers bargaining together to implement
157. See generally Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
158. Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 433-41.
159. Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 584.
160. Id.
161. Scott A. Freedman, Comment, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The
Second Circuit's Blanket Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett
v. NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 155, 165 (2004).
162. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
163. Id. at 237.
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after impasse on the terms of their last best good-faith wage offer?
Labor law itself regulates directly, and considerably, the kind of behavior
here at issue-the post-impasse imposition of a proposed employment term
concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining. 164
Note that Justice Breyer continually referred to mandatory terms within
the collective bargaining agreement.1 65 Justice Breyer's reasons for finding
the exemption applicable in Brown were specific and particular: "conduct took
place during and immediately after a collective-bargaining negotiation. It
grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining
process. It involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate
collectively. And, it concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining
relationship."' 166 Justice Breyer erred, however, in his inability to "find a
satisfactory basis for distinguishing football players from other organized
workers." 167
In Justice Stevens's dissent in Brown, he noted that the "limited judicial
exemption complements its statutory counterpart by ensuring that unions
which engage in collective bargaining to enhance employees' wages may
enjoy the benefits of the resulting agreements."1 68 In Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, the Supreme Court, in a
nonsports case, found that "a proper accommodation between the
congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the
congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires
that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory
exemption from antitrust sanctions."' 169 Justice Stevens agreed with the
majority that "the judicially crafted labor exemption must also cover some
collective action that employers take in response to a collective-bargaining
agent's demands for higher wages. Immunizing such action from antitrust
scrutiny may facilitate collective bargaining over labor demands."' 170 Justice
Stevens further declares:
In my view, however, neither the policies underlying the two separate
statutory schemes, nor the narrower focus on the purpose of the nonstatutory
exemption, provides a justification for exempting from antitrust scrutiny
164. Id. at 237-38.
165. See id. at 236-49.
166. Id. at 250.
167. Id. at 249-50.
168. Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (quoting Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)).
170. Id.
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collective action initiated by employers to depress wages below the level that
would be produced in a free market. Nor do those policies support a rule that
would allow employers to suppress wages by implementing noncompetitive
agreements among themselves on matters that have not previously been the
subject of either agreement with labor or even a demand by labor for inclusion
in the bargaining process. That, however, is what is at stake in this litigation.
In light of the accommodation that has been struck between antitrust and
labor law policy, it would be most ironic to extend an exemption crafted to
protect collective action by employees to protect employers acting jointly to
deny employees the opportunity to negotiate their salaries individually in a
competitive market. Perhaps aware of the irony, the Court chooses to analyze
this case as though it represented a typical impasse in an unexceptional
multiemployer bargaining process. 171
Both the majority and the dissent in Brown give little real ammunition for
the Second Circuit in Clarett III to misuse the reasoning of Brown. However,
the Second Circuit went to great lengths in its attempt to synthesize its
decisions in this area, (Caldwell, Williams, and Wood) to the alleged "similar
reasoning" in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc." 172
In shoring up its own basketball cases (e.g. Caldwell) the Second Circuit
quoted Brown with approval, but out of context: "The inception of a collective
bargaining relationship between employees and employers irrevocably alters
the governing legal regime."' 173 The Second Circuit continued with its
courting of the Brown imprimatur:
The following year, in Brown, the Supreme Court was presented with facts
similar to Williams, and eight Justices agreed that the non-statutory exemption
precludes antitrust claims against a professional sports league for unilaterally
setting policy with respect to mandatory bargaining subjects after negotiations
with the players union over those subjects reach impasse. There, a class of
professional football players challenged the NFL's unilateral institution of a
policy that permitted each team to establish a new squad of developmental
players and capped those players' weekly salaries after negotiations with the
players union over that proposal became deadlocked. Approaching the issue
largely as a "matter of logic," the Court found that to permit antitrust liability
in such a case would call into question a great deal of conduct, such as multi-
employer bargaining, that federal labor policy promotes and for which labor
171. Id. at 254-255.
172. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett I11), 369 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.
2004).
173. Id. at 137 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1995), affd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996)).
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law provides an array of rules and remedies. The Court held that the non-
statutory labor exemption necessarily applied not only to protect such labor
policies but also to prevent "antitrust courts" from usurping the NLRB's
responsibility for policing the collective bargaining process. 174
Although, the Second Circuit in Clarett I1 all but kowtowed to Brown, it
never connected the Supreme Court's rationale to the particulars of Clarett III:
The [Brown] Court also rejected a number of potential limits on the
exemption that were raised by the players and their supporters. First, the Court
held that the exemption was not so narrow as to protect only agreements
between the parties that are embodied in an existing collective bargaining
agreement. Second, in finding that the League's post-impasse action was
protected by the exemption, the court dismissed the suggestion that the
exemption should insulate the concerted action of employers only up to the
point at which negotiations reach impasse or a "reasonable time" thereafter.
Third, the court rejected the notion that courts in applying the exemption could
distinguish between bargaining "tactics," which the players argued should be
exempt, and unilaterally imposed "terms." Finally, the Court refused the
players' contention that the labor of professional sports players was unique
and that the market for players' services therefore should be treated differently
than other organized labor markets for purposes of the non-statutory
exemption. 175
But still there is no connection to Brown, other than a list of weak
similarities. But even the Second Circuit must admit that "the Court in
Brown... left the precise contours of the exemption undefined."1 76
Clarett argues that his case differs in material respects from Brown, but he
does not argue, nor do we find, that the Supreme Court's treatment of the non-
statutory exemption in that case gives reason to doubt the authority of our
prior decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood. Because we find that our
prior decisions in this area fully comport-in approach and result-with the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown, we regard them as controlling
authority. 17 7
The Second Circuit is guilty of mixing metaphors in its attempt to connect
Brown to its own sports exemption cases-Williams, Caldwell, Woods-all
professional basketball cases. 178 Maurice Clarett, though, is a football player,
and the whole universe of collective bargaining in professional football is
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 137-38 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 138; see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
177. ClarettIl, 369 F.3d at 138.
178. See id. at 136-38.
2009]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
different than in professional basketball. Brown does not broadly embrace the
exemption; there is nothing in Brown that would segue their tacit and limited
approval of the exemption to include a rule, such as the one in Clarett III, that
was never directly bargained over. 179
Judge Scheindlin's take on Brown was more precise. 180 Brown reiterated
the fact that the exemption which emanated from federal labor statutes, set
forth "a national labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining,
which require good faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working
conditions... ."181 Judge Scheindlin stated that the Brown Court also
"recognized the primacy of collective bargaining in the workplace, even when
the agreements reached through that bargaining would otherwise violate the
antitrust laws' prohibition on combinations in restraint of trade."' 182 Judge
Scheindlin quotes from Brown with approval:
As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the same time
to forbid them to make among themselves or with each other any of the
competition-restricting agreements potentially necessary to make the process
work or its results mutually acceptable. Thus, the implicit exemption
recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and to allow
meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition
imposed through the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust
sanctions. 183
The emphasis in the quote from Brown was supplied by Judge Scheindlin:
"[S]ome restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process
must be shielded from antitrust sanctions." 184
Judge Scheindlin notes that in Brown the Supreme Court "reiterated that
the exemption is limited to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining and
covers only conduct that arises from collective bargaining process."1
85
Although this is not quoted from Brown per se, the emphasis on the word
"process" was again supplied by Scheindlin. And, of course, in Clarett, there
was not even a scintilla of "process." 186
179. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 248-50.
180. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett 1), 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
181. Id. (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 236).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 393; see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 239.
186. ClarettI, 306 F. Supp. 2d. at 385-87.
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"In Brown, the question was whether a unilateral decision to impose a
salary cap on NFL practice squad players violated antitrust laws when that cap
was imposed by team owners after reaching a bargaining impasse with the
NFLPA."1 87 "In holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied...,
the Court noted that 'impasse and an accompanying implementation of
proposals constitute an integral part of the bargaining process.' The Court
repeatedly stated that the purpose behind the exemption was to support the
collective bargaining process and ensure that it worked in the manner intended
by Congress."1 8
8
The emphases were supplied by Judge Scheindlin. Because Brown does
not elucidate the exemption's contours in every sports situation, Judge
Scheindlin counted the number of times that "process" was emphasized; in
fact, the policy must constitute "an integral part of the bargaining process."1 89
Without a thorough and complete process, (e.g. a bona fide, arm's-length
negotiation), the application of the nonstatutory exemption would refute the
very labor policies that it was developed to protect. 190
VI. THE REINTERPRETATION IN PIAZZA WAS INNOVATIVE, WHEREAS IN
CLARETTIII IT WAS MISGUIDED
The Court in Piazza was faced with the daunting task of accepting a
similar situation from recent Supreme Court precedence. However, the
precedence that had to be avoided in Piazza, was Flood, a notoriously
unpopular case.191 The task was to reevaluate baseball's exemption in a
manner that would make it less broad so as to immunize baseball from all of
its various types of relationships.'9 2 "In 1992, Pamela Postema, baseball's
token female umpire, sued under a gender-based employment discrimination
claim, exploring Federal Baseball Club of Balitmore, Toolson, and Flood and
concluded that the exemption was limited to baseball's reserve clause and to
its league structure."' 193 "The court has not specifically determined whether
187. Id. at 393.
188. Champion, Clarett, supra note 28, at 614 (quoting Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d
at 316) (emphasis added).
189. Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 239).
190. See id.
191. See generally Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
192. Id.
193. Postema v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 799 F.Supp. 1475, 1488
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) rev'd & remd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993);
Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 579-80.
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the exemption applies to baseball's conduct outside the domain of league
structure and player rotation." 194 Flood, however, offered some suggestions
on how to revise itself on the basis that the exemption was based on the
"recognition and acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and
needs."' 95 Therefore, the exemption might not extend to conduct that fails to
include these particular characteristics or needs. 196
Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Flood
itself therefore created the possibility that it was "at least theoretically possible
that baseball would be subject to antitrust liability for any conduct that was
unrelated to the reserve system or to league structure." 197  In 1982, for
example, "a court explicitly found that the exemption did not protect
professional baseball from a suit by a radio station against a team owner,
because broadcasting is not central enough to the sport to be covered by the
exemption."1 98
Postema, of course, did indeed limit the exemption to the reserve system
and league structure; specifically, it excluded the exemption from
encompassing umpire employment relations. 199 "Anti-competitive conduct
toward umpires is not an essential part of baseball and in no way enhances its
vitality or viability. '200 "Unlike the league structure or [the structure of] the
reserve system, baseball's relations with non-players are not a unique
characteristic or need of the game." 20 1  The next logical step of this
progression would be the further limiting of the exemption's coverage from
"league structure and reserve system" to the reserve system only-enter
Piazza. Piazza could not overrule Flood per se, but it did reinterpret it so that
it could be restricted to pertaining only to the reserve clause. 202 Remember,
Flood itself admitted that the exemption was illogical, and that it was an
"inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by Congress
and not by this Court. ' 203 Even Chief Justice Burger in his concurrence noted
that, "it is time the Congress acted to solve this problem." 204"There can be no
194. Postema, 799 F.Supp. at 1488.
195. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
196. Id.; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 580.
197. Postema, 799 F.Supp. at 1488; Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 580.
198. See, e.g., Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F.Supp. 263,
265 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Champion, Baseball, supra note 2, at 580.
199. Postema, 799 F.Supp. at 1489.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
203. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972).
204. Id. at 286.
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doubt "that 'were we considering the question of baseball for the first time
upon a clean slate' we would hold it to be subject to federal antitrust
regulation. The unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us from
correcting our own mistakes." 20 5
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Clarett III held that the NFL's
three year "sent from high school" eligibility rule was protected from antitrust
scrutiny based on the applicability of the nonstatutory labor exemption. 20 6
Although the Court admitted that there was no bargaining between the union
and management over the rule, that alone did not exclude the rule from the
scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption. 20 7 The Second Circuit had to
cobble together an argument that would somehow side step the fact that there
was no bargaining over the rule. 208 The Circuit Court in Clarett III combined
Wood, Caldwell, and Williams, along with the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Brown, which applied the nonstatutory labor exemption to
management's unilaterally setting of wages for developmental squad
players. 20
9
"Clarett [III] contends that the NFL clubs invited antitrust liability when
they agreed amongst themselves to impose the same criteria on every
prospective player.... ." [F]ederal labor policy permits NFL teams to act
collectively as a multiemployer bargaining unit in structuring the rules of play
and setting criteria for player employment. ' 210 The Clarett III appeals court
averred that the fact that the rule excluded some potential employees from
consideration "does not render the NFL's adherence to its eligibility rules as a
multi-employer bargaining unit suspect." 211
The Second Circuit noted that "the eligibility rules ... were well known to
the union." 212  The "union [also] agreed to waive any challenge to the
Constitution and Bylaws and thereby acquiesced in the continuing operation of
the eligibility rules contained therein-at least for the duration of the
agreement. '213 This clause gives the NFL "control over any changes to the
205. Id. at 288. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Radovich v. Nat'l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
206. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League (Clarett II1), 369 F.3d 124, 143 (2d Cir.
2004).
207. Id. at 142.
208. Id. at 142-43.
209. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 260; see also Clarett III, 369
F.3d at 136-38.
210. ClarettIII, 369 F.3dat 141.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 142.
213. Id.
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eligibility rules .... ."114 The Second Circuit summarized Maurice Clarett's
suit as "simply a prospective employee's disagreement with the criteria,
established by the employer and the labor union, that he must meet in order to
be considered for employment. 215 The Second Circuit in Clarett III, like the
United States Supreme Court in Brown, declined to "fashion an antitrust
exemption [giving] additional advantages to professional football players...
that transport workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy." 216
VII. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals in Clarett III did not deal with Brown, as much as it
sidestepped it. Clarett I changed the rules of discussion by elevating the labor
laws to a point that essentially eliminated the use of antitrust as a viable means
to effectuate change in professional sports. The Clarett III appeals decision
ignored Brown by using smoke and mirrors. Brown did not eliminate antitrust
litigation in professional sports, but the Clarett III appeals decision effectively
did just that; that is, it went against the tenor and philosophy of Brown.
Piazza, on the other hand, takes its cues from Flood itself, and is symmetrical,
respectful, and obedient to Supreme Court precedence, even if its precedence,
in the case of Flood, is dubious at best.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 143.
216. Id. (citing Brown v. Pro. Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996)).
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